For decades, the European legislators and the Court of Justice have extended the rights to free movement and cross-border welfare in the European Union (EU). Strong assumptions on the impact of these rules have been posed, some concluding these to be a fundamental challenge to the welfare state while others see the rules as confirming transnational welfare solidarity. However, studies of how these rules are implemented and what become the de-facto outcomes hereof remain scarce. We address this research gap, by examining domestic responses to and outcomes of dynamic EU rules.
Introduction
The legislation of the European Union (EU) grants EU citizens a right to move and reside freely within the Union and a right to access welfare across borders. These rules and rights have long been contested and their impact on the welfare state discussed (Kvist 2004; Hemerijck 2013; Blauberger and Schmidt 2014; Ferrera 2005 Ferrera , 2017 Anderson 2015; Conant 2002; Verschueren 2012 Verschueren , 2015 .
Recently the political salience of these rules and rights stood out most clearly in the British debate on EU membership. EU citizens on the British labour market -and their rights to welfare benefitsresulted in a heated, polarised debate and the UK voted Leave (Reenen 2016; Geddes and HadjAbdou 2016) . Also in the scholarly literature, the relationship between free movement of people and the welfare state is discussed. One strand of research finds the welfare state to be highly challenged by free movement, in particular social market economies and more inclusive welfare states (Scharpf 2002 (Scharpf , 2010 Höpner and Schäfer 2012) . Another strand of research takes a more optimistic view and argues that transnational welfare solidarity has developed (De Witte 2015) .
Here, the right to cross-border welfare in the European Union (EU) is posed as the scholarly example (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009) . In particular, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is found to be the main driver of change -an agent that has interpreted European rules "in ways that profoundly affect domestic economic, social, and cultural life" (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 594) . According to this view, supranational social rights have been introduced through the judicial backdoor.
Both strands of research assume that the free movement of people has a considerable impact on the welfare state. They foster an image of the welfare state undergoing rather fundamental change.
However, conclusions are reached primarily by examining EU rules and rights as they develop at the supranational level, whereas research into the subsequent domestic responses and outcomes of these dynamics has been lacking. 1 In this paper, we address this research gap in order to account for the dynamic scope and impact of EU rules when implemented on the ground (Versluis 2007) . We first analyse how EU rules and rights have dynamically been set, gradually extending the rights of EU citizens to welfare benefits, traditionally reserved for own citizens or long term residents. In particular, the CJEU has been a key player, breaking new ground for a European social Union (de la Porte and Emmenegger 2017; Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Blauberger and Schmidt 2014) . We then turn to analysing the impact at the national level of these dynamic rules and rights. We take Denmark as our welfare state case. As detailed in the section on case selection below, Denmark constitutes a critical case for examining such impact. Within Denmark, we analyse domestic responses and outcomes of EU rules and rights for two main non-contributory benefits: study grants and social assistance. EU political and legal integration makes it possible that these benefits, traditionally reserved to national citizens or long term residents, become more immediately accessible for EU citizens, thus breaing new ground for a European social union (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; De Witte 2015) . At the same time, EU integration implies new cost-containment challenges to the welfare state as entitlements to non-contributory benefits do not depend on contribution (Scharpf 2002 (Scharpf , 2010 Höpner and Schäfer 2012 The article is structured as follows. Below, we present Denmark as our case selected and the data for our analysis. We then turn to the dynamics of EU integration, adding in scholarly views on why domestic responses should be taken into account in order to understand and explain the impact of dynamics rules and rights. Subsequently, we analyse three forms of domestic responses; judicial, political and administrative. We then examine the outcomes of EU rules, measured as EU citizens'
de facto use of the two non-contributory benefits in Denmark between 2002-2013. Finally, we conclude on the findings and explanations for why EU rules did not impact as public and scholarly assumptions have posed.
Case selection and data
We examine responses and outcomes to EU rules in the Danish welfare state. The Danish welfare state is often presented as distinct. First, the Danish welfare state has traditionally been characterised as universalist, promoting equality of status among its citizens. Social policies are not targeted at low income groups, as in the residual welfare state but go to the middleclass as to the poor. Second, social rights are granted on the basis of residence (Cornelissen 1997, 32) . A person is entitled to welfare because s/he has legal residence, and not as a result of social contributions or citizenship. Third, benefits have traditionally been tax-financed and not based on contributions.
Social security is not dependent on labour market participation, as in the insurance-based welfare state (Korpi and Palme 1998) . However, tax payment is not a direct requirement to receive a specific social benefit. Due to these characteristics, the Danish welfare state has been regarded as more unfit to the rationales of EU cross-border welfare, in particular because residents can access welfare without necessarily contributing to its financing.
We examine responses and outcomes between 2002 to the the end of 2013. These years have been chosen because they cover a period of essential structural change in European integration. During this time, the EU experienced its grand enlargements, which included a considerable increase in socio-economic differences across the Union. Moreover, the period covers important changes in legal and political regional integration as well as the post-2008 financial and economic crises. Our outcome study is based on Danish register data. Data availability does not allow us to go beyond the end of 2013. However, this is a considerable temporal update, as we generally lack impact studies and in particular studies after the 2004 enlargement of the EU.
We research outcomes for two main non-contributory benefits: study grants and social assistance.
EU political and legal integration makes it possible that these benefits, traditionally reserved to national citizens or long term residents, become more immediately accessible for EU citizens.
Thereby access to these benefits potentially break new grounds for a European social Union while at the same time having negative cost-containment consequences for the welfare state because the EU citizen may be entitled to benefits without having contributed financially to them. The benefits are tax-financed, non-contributory and relatively generous. A Danish study grant is approximately 800 euro per month. This is a universal benefit granted to all students regardless of their parents' income. Additionally, students can take loans. A Danish social assistance benefit is approximately 1450 euro per month. Social assistance is a minimum means benefit granted to the unemployed who do not qualify for the higher contribution-dependent unemployment benefits. As study grants, social assistance is purely tax-financed and granted to individuals without other means of support.
We examine different types of domestic responses: judicial, political and administrative. Judicial responses cover domestic legal proceedings interpreting the specific EU rules and rights as they take place when national court rulings or quasi judicial proceedings consider EU law in relation to domestic policies and law. Political and administrative responses concern the domestic ex post interpretations of specific EU rules and rights. Domestic responses to EU rules may take two forms: Denmark. However, gaining access to the full population is seldom granted and has, to our knowledge, never been compiled for Denmark or other countries. Thus, this unique dataset enables us to examine the evolution of EU citizens' consumption of the selected benefits over a long period of time. We compare this with the evolution of the rest of the population in Denmark using of the same benefits. Finally, we use population and migration administrative register information to measure the length of residence in Denmark that the EU citizen had up to the 31 st of December of each year. By taking the length of residence into account, we examine the more immediate access to these benefits, i.e. the extent to which non-contributory benefits are granted after a short residence, which is defined as up to one year or depend on a certain degree on social integration, i.e., a longer period of residence.
Setting the scope of cross-border welfare: Dynamic rules and domestic responses
The right to free movement and cross-border welfare is laid down by a complex set of rules. Baumbast). In the Grzelczyk case, the Court established that EU citizens 'may expect a certain degree of financial solidarity' from the member states, thus suggesting the right to equal treatment before the legislated five years of residence.
The Residence Directive also establishes that the need for social protection may terminate the right to reside. One must not become an 'unreasonable burden' on the social assistance system of the host member state. In this aspect, the Residence Directive is more restrictive than the Regulations or the case-law establishing Union citizenship, as it sets limits on cross-border social protection. Although the EU legislature and the CJEU have had many years of clarifying the scope of cross-border welfare, key aspects still require greater specification: 1) the right to equal treatment before five years of residence and 2) the definition of 'unreasonable burden'. These underarticulated or undefined concepts leave considerable discretion to the national government. As noted by Thym, the EU legislature is likely to have deliberately left the definition open and ambiguous to allow for these discrepancies (Thym 2015, 26) .
Furthermore, the EU legislature has not specified who is deemed a worker under EU law. The Court has interpreted this incomplete concept, but has not settled it. In the case of Kempf ( The process of filling the gap left by the EU legislator and the CJEU is thus an imperfect journey.
Moreover, the path of legal integration has its own twists and turns, which introduces new uncertainties and thus more discretion for member states in implementing EU legislation. From 2008 onwards, the Court has embarked on a more restrictive course regarding the rights to social benefits of the economically inactive. It has turned away from granting rights on basis of the Treaty's provision on European citizenship and started to pay more attention to the words of the EU legislature, as stated in its secondary legislation. In the Förster (C-158/07) case, the Court examined the more restrictive formulations of the secondary law, as contained in Residence Directive 2004/38, derogating from the general right to equal treatment of Union citizens (Dougan 2013: 140) . The more restrictive judicial approach has become even more notable in the recent case-law of Dano (C-333/13), Alimanovic (C-67/14) and García-Nieto (C-299/14). More recent jurisprudence suggests that the Court now focuses more on the objectives of the EU legislature (Verschueren 2012 (Verschueren , 2015 Dougan 2013; Hatzopoulos and Hervey 2013; Martinsen 2015) . This is the background against which member states take over when applying EU rules and rights onto the national level. Neither the EU legislature nor the judiciary have specified how to do so, and Judicial responses concern the ways in which national courts make use of CJEU decisions and EU law in national legal proceedings and the extent to which they make preliminary references to the CJEU to clarify points of national and EU law. A key assumption is that national courts have been increasingly socialised into accepting CJEU decisions and will integrate these into domestic jurisprudence (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 615; Alter 2001) . However, other scholars note that national courts are often reluctant to act as decentral enforcers of EU law (Slepcevic 2009; Börzel 2006; Davies 2012; Conant 2002; Wind 2009 ). Thus, the extent to which national courts act as decentral enforcers of EU law should be subject to empirical testing.
Political responses concern the ways in which national politicians react to changes in EU rules.
When political or judicial changes occur at the supranational level, national politicians decide how to implement these rules. EU rules often leave room for discretion in terms of how to comply (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Versluis 2007; Conant 2002; Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2016) .
How politicians react within this manoeuvrable space and the extent to which they adhere to EU law is a conditioning factor on outcomes (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Conant 2002 ).
Consequently, domestic politics is a factor that should be considered when studying the implementation of EU rules.
Administrative responses concern the ways in which civil servants process EU rules, as adopted in national laws, decrees, instructions or domestic court cases, onto the target group. The target group in our case are EU citizens applying for social benefits. Implementation research reveals that civil servants' behaviour, capacity and attention are crucial to policy outputs and outcomes, as they make 'important discretionary decisions' about the implementation of policy for the target group (Winter 2012, 260) . When processing EU rules all the way to concrete welfare outcomes, the behaviour and decisions of the local administration and the street-level bureaucrat also come into play (Lipsky 1980; Winter 2012; Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2016) . The dispositions of local and street-level bureaucrats may also be influenced by judicial and political responses. The adherence of national courts to EU law becomes important in this regard (Conant 2002) . If an issue is assigned high political salience, administrative actors are found to pay more attention (Winter 2012; Versluis 2007) . Furthermore, the clarity of rules and rights may become important for their implementation and outcomes. Finally, supervision, clearly communicated goals and expectations may diminish divergence in between political objectives and implementation.
Therefore, domestic responses may take different directions, underpinning or hindering the effective implementation of EU law. We now turn to the way in which Danish actors responded to the dynamic rules of EU cross border welfare, in order to account for the outcomes which will be examined in the subsequent section.
Domestic Reponses
EU decision making results from long, detailed negotiations between the member states in the Council and the members of the European Parliament and subsequent legal interpretation. However, as demonstrated above gaps still exist in the regulatory framework. Such gaps are left for domestic actors to handle subsequently and apply in practice. Domestic gap-filling is done in courts, by the government and political majorities as well as by national civil-servants, whether they act from the ministries, the local municipalities or interpret rules on the ground.
Judicial Responses
To cover the domestic judicial responses, we searched in national legal databases for national court cases concerning EU citizens and the two benefits analysed in our study. Secondly, we searched for principle administrative rulings on this issue. Principle administrative rulings are quasi-judicial proceedings decided by the Danish Board of Appeal. These administrative rulings are deemed to be of more principled character and thus can guide caseworkers in their future decisions (National Board of Appeal 2014). Thus, they play a crucial role in defining future administrative practice. By including these quasi-judicial proceedings in our analysis, we could identify whether a former administrative decision was reversed by the appeals system, ultimately granting the benefit. We then asked civil servants to consider these results during the interviews we conducted. The civil servants all confirmed our findings and provided background information on the ways in which the administrative principle rulings are applied and sometimes contested in practice.
Judicial considerations of EU law in Danish courts proved to be none for the two benefits examined within the studied period. No court cases have been decided regarding EU citizens and the two noncontributory benefits. Litigation is evidently not common. This can partly be explained by the fact that Denmark does not have social courts (Martinsen 2005) . Social policy cases are normally handled within the administrative recourse system. Additionally, bringing an appeal to the court system is demanding both in terms of resources and time, which limits these beneficiary groupsbeing EU students and unemployed-from litigating, as they are less familiarised with the Danish administrative recourse system than Danes (interviews, civil servants, May 2016).
However, it should be noted that like judicial responses, principle administrative rulings are binding sources of law that practitioners shall take into consideration when deciding upon a benefit application (National Appeals Board 2014). The principle rulings concerning social assistance and study grants to EU nationals substantiate the need for clarification of the concept of a worker under EU law. Over time and with new principle rulings, clarification of when to deem someone a worker has developed. As data availability for this most recent part of the analysis allows us to include data up to May 2016, we include more recent decisions.
A total of 26 relevant principle rulings were identified dealing with the granting of either social assistance or study grants to EU nationals from January 2002 until May 2016. Seven were on social assistance, whereas the bulk -nineteen rulings -concerned study grants.
The principle rulings on social assistance do not as a whole reflect a restrictive response. Of the seven principle rulings on social assistance, four granted the benefit (decisions no. 27-07, 180-09, 190-11, 38-12 Overall, Danish judicial responses tend to be restrictive. We found no national court cases in this field. Instead, principle decisions from the appeals bodies should take EC law into account.
However, principle decisions display a defensive clarification of EU legal obligations. The CJEU ruling LN vs Styrelsen was followed by a long strand of judicial responses to specify, define and possibly control the impact of EU law on Danish administrative practices.
Political and Administrative Responses
Politically, the examined period is marked by change in government. . That the need for social assistance may negatively affect the right to reside has also become increasingly clear (interview, ibid). The local case-worker has access to data and information on an EU citizen's worker status, estate and on family members' personal situation.
In this way, the caseworker can exert considerable administrative control on the right to benefits. A more coherent but also restrictive administrative practice has developed over the years in which the entitlement to social assistance and how it conditions the right to reside depends on both the worker and residence status of EU citizens. The online appendix details how the right to have equal access to Danish social assistance depends on the category to which an EU citizen belongs.
Study grants
The expanded access to the Danish study grants triggered by the CJEU ruling LN vs Styrelsen in to adopt 'safeguards'. 6 The agreement also ordered the Ministry of Higher Education and Science to follow the development and report back to the parties. Finally, the government believed that more control over the worker status of students should be exercised. Thus, the responsible agency introduced an automatic search every three months among all EU citizens receiving study grants to determine whether either the number of hours they worked or their salary has decreased. If so, their cases were to be assessed individually (interview, civil servant, May 2016).
These enhanced control mechanisms have resulted in over 1600 cases in which EU citizens have been asked to repay their study grants (Ministry for Higher Education and Science, May 2016). At the same time, the number of EU citizens receiving study grants as a result of the CJEU case has risen from 1345 students in 2013 to 4484 students in 2015. The costs of the study grants paid to EU workers amounts to 319 million DKK, which is still below the 390 million DKK mark that was established as the ceiling in the agreement of 2013 (Ibid.). In fact, 319 million DKK accounts for a rather modest 1.5% of the total Danish study grant costs of 21.5 billion DKK. Nevertheless, the current government has announced that it is ready to effectuate the agreement's safeguards, but has so far not been able to establish political majority to do so. Thus, the government is ready to adopt a general restrictive reform to reduce the effects of the EU law.
Outcomes
We now turn to examine how actual outcomes have developed alongside the extension of crossborder welfare rights. Between 2002 and 2013, the number of EU citizens in Denmark rose significantly from 53,782 to 159,857 people. 7 By the end of 2013, the five main states of origin for EU citizens in Denmark were Poland, Romania, Sweden, Germany and the UK.
However, despite the significant increase of EU citizens in Denmark, as well as the extended rights to free movement and cross-border welfare, we find no corresponding increase in the proportion of eligible EU citizens receiving the two non-contributory benefits. We present the proportions of social assistance beneficiaries among EU citizens disaggregated by the duration of their residence in Denmark on December 31 st of the year of measurement. As shown in Figure 2 , the largest portion of EU citizens receiving social assistance are long-term residents,
i.e., individuals who have resided in Denmark for more than five years and therefore are entitled to equal treatment according to the EU Residence Directive. Assessed by years of residence, we see that de facto a rather strong link is established between EU citizens and Denmark as a host state before social assistance is received. The more immediate access to social assistance is not supported by our findings. Table 2 supports the notion that long-term EU residents are the primary consumers of social assistance. Hence, for the two groups of EU residents that have resided in Denmark for fewer than two years, the proportion of recipients has declined from 2002 to 2013 both as a percentage of the total group of eligible EU citizens and in absolute numbers. Though the absolute numbers of both groups of EU residents having resided in Denmark more than two years have increased across the study period, the percentages of EU residents in Denmark receiving benefits among all eligible EU citizens have declined. Turning to study grants, we see that the proportion of EU citizens receiving this benefit decreased the CJEU issued its ruling, the increase is more considerable than in previous years. For study grants, we see that the percentage of EU citizens receiving the benefits increased from 5.24 percent in 2002 to 6.52 percent at the end of 2013. For this benefit, data availability has not made it possible to consider whether a study grant was received for a minimum period of time within a year.
Receiving the benefit may therefore reflect everything between 1 month and a full year. As with social assistance, we compare the proportion of EU citizens receiving study grants with the proportion of the rest of the population in Denmark receiving study grants throughout the study period. 11 It should be noted that the study grant recipients among the rest of the population are full- We also examined the recipients of study grants by duration of residence in Denmark. As shown in Figure 4 , throughout the study period, more than 50 percent of EU citizens receiving the benefit had been residing in Denmark for at least 5 years. Hence, in accordance with the Residence Directive, they enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of the hosting member state. In this way, this finding reflects the result for social assistance: a rather strong link between recipient and host state is established before the benefit is received. Table 4 summarizes the absolute numbers of EU citizens receiving the study grant benefit. The data in Table 4 show that the practical significance of the change is not dramatic. Thus, the changes in the percentage of study grant recipients among all eligible EU citizens are marginal. 
Conclusion
The relationship between the free movement of people and the welfare state is a increasingly salient issue in the EU. Scholarly views are divided on the extent to which these rules challenge the welfare state, but most studies concentrate on the supranational development of rules and rights rather than their actual outcomes. As in comparative welfare studies (Green-Pedersen 2004) , EU studies on free movement and the welfare state suffer from their own dependent variable problem in which the object of studying change differs widely and is oftentimes undefined. However, the need to be more precise when studying the nexus of EU migration and the welfare state is more than a theoretical call. Currently, the empirical call is equally strong, as EU rules are increasingly contested and has been noted as a main reason for Brexit (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2016; Reenen 2016) .
In this paper, we asked the extent to which EU citizens have gained more immediate access to noncontributory Danish welfare benefits, and if so why or why not? Our findings first note that the percentages of EU citizens receiving social assistance and study grants remain low. 
